Patent disclosure and R&D competition in pharmaceuticals by Pammolli, Fabio et al.
Patent Disclosure and R&D Competition
in Pharmaceuticals
Laura Magazzini∗, Fabio Pammolli†,
Massimo Riccaboni‡, Maria Alessandra Rossi§¶
April 18, 2009
Abstract
The prominent role played by patents within the pharmaceutical do-
main is unquestionable. In this paper we take an unusual perspective
and focus on a relatively neglected implication of patents: the effect of
patent-induced information disclosure (of both successes and failures)
on the dynamics of R&D and market competition. The study builds
upon the combination of two large datasets, linking the information
about patents to firm level data on R&D projects and their outcome.
Two case studies in the fields of anti-inflammatory compounds and
cancer research complement our analysis. We show the important role
played by patent disclosure in shaping firms technological trajectories
through the possibility of reciprocal monitoring in a context of parallel
research efforts, and suggest the importance of enhancing the diffusion
of information concerning failures, not only to avoid wasteful dupli-
cation of innovative efforts, but also as a tool for the identification of
promising research trajectories.
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1 Introduction
The pharmaceutical industry is a textbook example of a science based sector
characterized by high R&D cost, uncertain and spillovers for which patent
protection assures appropriability thus providing incentives for innovation.
Indeed, Mansfield (1986) found that, absent patent protection, 60 percent
of pharmaceutical inventions would not have been developed and 65 percent
would not have been commercialized. Since then, the market segment for
patented pharmaceutical products has gained a greater relevance than in
many other industries. Moreover, patents play a crucial signalling role for
venture capital and big pharmaceutical companies’ investment decisions and
dealmaking in markets for technologies. Against this background, the rela-
tionship between intellectual property rights, innovation and public health is
at the heart of a blossoming international debate (WHO 2006). A recent em-
pirical test of the “tragedy of the anticommons” (Heller and Eisenberg 1998)
shows that, although modestly, upstream patenting in biotechnology might
hinder the diffusion of scientific knowledge (Murray and Stern 2007).
This paper aims at contributing to the pharmaceutical patent debate
by focusing on a relatively neglected function of patents, which was already
characterized by Kenneth Arrow in his seminal contribution (Arrow 1962),
that is information disclosure. In particular, we focus on the effect of patent-
induced disclosure of information on the dynamics of both R&D and market
competition. Most of the literature on patent disclosure has highlighted
the trade-offs involved by the fact that patents tend to reveal “positive”
information on a firm’s technological advancements that might be prone to
imitation by competing firms.
This paper, by contrast, identifies the crucial role patents play in provid-
ing negative information1. The value of negative information is particularly
important in light of the fact that it wouldn’t be otherwise available to
competing firms due to the strong publication bias against negative results
of clinical trials (Zarin and Tse 2008, Johnson and Dickersin 2007, Chan
et al. 2004). Indeed, while information on biological and therapeutic prop-
erties of a pharmaceutical product can be easily obtained when it reaches the
market, in most cases firms do not publicly disclose the reasons behind their
failures, making the associated patent a fundamental source of information
available.
In order to address this issue, the paper relies on the combination of
two large datasets: the first includes all pharmaceutical and biotechnology
1See also David et al. (1992), Orsenigo et al. (2001).
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patents granted by the USPTO since 1965, while the second comprises firm
data at the level of specific R&D projects. Once integrated, the two dataset
allows a comparison of the patterns of citations received by, on one side,
patents associated to successful projects, i.e. those that led to a marketable
product and, on the other side, patents associated to failed projects, i.e.
projects that were discontinued in clinical trials. Citations, in turn, are
taken as a measure of knowledge utilization and spillovers. One of the most
interesting findings of the analysis is that, although discontinued patents do
receive a lower overall number of citations, a large share of them continues
to receive citations by other companies even after the project has turned out
to be a failure, which suggests that the information these patents provide is
relevant to competing firms.
To further corroborate our results, we present two case studies, based
upon throughput analysis of patent documents and of related scientific liter-
ature and discussions with industry and scientific experts. The first case con-
cerns anti-inflammatory drug development (p38 MAPK inhibitors), whereas
the second one study the development of a family of anti-cancer drugs (DNA
topoisomerase inhibitors). Both of them show patent disclosure’s role in
shaping firms’ technological trajectories through the possibility of recipro-
cal monitoring they open up in a context characterized by parallel research
efforts.
The case studies have been selected on the basis of the following criteria:
1. Relevance. The first case study on p38 MAPK inhibitors describe the
efforts of almost all big pharmaceutical companies and biotech firms
to find a safer and more powerful alternative to COX-2 inhibitors in
the anti-inflammatory market that was worth more than 15 billion
dollars after Vioxx withdrawal in 2004. The second case shows the de-
velopment of inhibitors of the topoisomerases which have been useful
in treating cell proliferative conditions, in particular, human cancers.
Topoisomerases and has been clearly identified as a validated molec-
ular target for a variety of widely prescribed anticancer drugs and
collectively, the topoisomerase inhibitors comprise 6 percent of the
total world market for cancer drugs in chemotherapy.
2. Patent value. Early patents are highly cited even if the associated
compounds failed to reach the market. Fierce competition and lack
of immediate feedbacks has “forced”companies to enter in the arena
on the unique basis of the most recent scientific advances (patent dis-
closure) and projections without waiting for the final outcome of the
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research on the first innovative compounds. In both cases there is no
publicly available information of the reasons of failure of R&D projects.
3. Parallel, ongoing R&D efforts. In the first case, out of 68 candidate
compounds half have been discontinued, half are still active and no
drug is available on the market yet. In the second case, despite there
are two drugs on the market they have heavy side effects and out
of 90 R&D projects focused on the development of topoisomerase I
inhibitors more than 60 percent are still active.
The results of this paper thus contribute to characterize pharmaceutical
innovation as a domain characterized by “races” for reaching the market in
which competitors pursue parallel research trajectories learning from both
each other’s successes and failures. However, building on a success does not
lead to an increase in the probability of success, whereas we are not able to
provide a clear-cut answer for projects building on a failure. Even though
not precisely estimated, patents building on a previous failure experience a
lower probability of success, but the reverse is true if the citation is made
after the outcome of the project becomes known.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of
the role of the patent system in information disclosure by identifying some
elements of the economics debates surrounding the effectiveness of patent-
induced information disclosures. Moreover, it highlights a few reasons why,
prima facie, patent disclosure might be more important in the pharma-
ceutical than in other sectors. Section 3 describes the data, methods and
summarizes empirical results. Section 4 presents the two case studies in the
anti-inflammatory and anti-cancer research fields providing evidence of the
role of disclosure in shaping the competitive environment. The final session
presents a general discussion and draws some implications for public policy.
2 Patents and Information Disclosure
The patent system is meant to perform a disclosure function that is sur-
prisingly neglected in recent theoretical analyses but enjoys a relatively
high popularity with courts. In exchange of exclusive rights over inven-
tions, patent-holders are required to disclose their protected inventions to
the public so as to allow an effective diffusion of technological knowledge.
This exchange is often referred to as a bargain between inventors and the
State and it is in fact an inherent feature of the dual nature of patents
(Arrow 1962). According to this view, patent protection increases the avail-
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ability of scientific and technological knowledge that would otherwise be
kept secret, inducing both direct benefits in the form of increased knowl-
edge diffusion and indirect benefits in the form of a reduction of wasteful
duplication of innovative efforts.
The general principle of patent disclosure is defined differently in differ-
ent legal contexts, although its essence tends to be the same in any patent
system2. The common principle of “enablement” requires inventors to dis-
close enough information to enable anyone skilled in the art to practice and
reproduce the invention. This has become a worldwide minimum standard
of adequacy of disclosure (Reichman 1995)3.
The exact content of the disclosure requirement is difficult to spell out.
Multiple doctrines have developed in different jurisdictions in order to clarify
the implications of the disclosure requirement, not leading, however, to the
emergence of an agreed-upon standard for disclosure. For instance, while in
the US the legal standard involves a “best mode” requirement, i.e. patent
applicants have to provide the information available at the time the applica-
tion is filed on the best way to carry out the invention, no such requirement
is explicitly provided for by EU law.
The patent disclosure function is surrounded by some degree of con-
troversy also from an economic standpoint. On the critical side, patent
disclosure function is held to be very limited because of patent applicants’
incentives to withhold as much information as possible. Also, the concrete
availability of the option to the keep the invention secret has been ques-
tioned (Plant 1934) and the hypothesis that only inventions that cannot be
kept secret are in fact patented has been historically advanced (Machlup
and Penrose 1950, Bessen 2005), pointing to the fact that patents, after
all, do not facilitate the circulation of information that wouldn’t otherwise
be available. Finally, some theoretical models of patenting behavior have
also highlighted the possibility that the disclosure obligation might induce
inventors not to patent (Horstmann et al. 1985, Scotchmer and Green 1990).
On the positive side, some insights on the social value of patent disclo-
sures have recently been offered by authors emphasizing the effects of dis-
2Art. 29(1) of the TRIPs Agreement states that “[m]embers shall require that an ap-
plicant for a patent shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete
for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art...”. Provisions similar to
the one set forth in the TRIPs Agreement appear, for instance, in art. 83 of the European
Patent Convention and in 35 U.S.C. §112, para. 1.
3This suggests the existence of some correlation between the scope of disclosure and
the scope of claims, although it seems that a consensus is emerging on both sides of the
Atlantic on the fact that this correspondence should not be considered excessively strict
(Janis 2000).
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closure on rent-seeking behavior and as a means to convey information on
new uses of a given technology (Landes and Posner 2003). Moreover, some
attention has been devoted to the role patents play in indirectly promoting
information disclosure, with a special twist on strategic aspects (Anton and
Yao 2003, Baker et al. 2005, Lichtman et al. 2000, Parchomovsky 2000).
Indeed, strategic considerations may induce prospective patentees partici-
pating in a race to disclose valuable research results before their competitors
apply for a patent for a variety of reasons, including the aim to foreclose
the latter possibility and the aim to delay the end of the race by narrowing
the extent of the “inventive step” that current inventions enjoy over existing
prior art.
Differently from prior literature, our focus in this paper is on the direct
effect exerted by patents in inducing information revelation through the
fulfillment of the so-called “enablement requirement”, e.g. the textbook
disclosure function of the patent system.
The effectiveness of patents’ disclosure function is, ultimately, an empir-
ical question (Cohen et al. 2000, Levin et al. 1987).
Taking a different perspective, studies have also explored whether infor-
mation disclosed through patents and available in patent databases are of
any use to firms in different sectors. In principle, patent-induced information
might be useful to firms in various ways: as means to monitor technological
advances in their own sector; as a way to identify new applications of existing
technologies in fields unrelated to the one in which they were developed; and
as a way of gathering relevant legal information, such as information on the
likelihood that one’s own patent infringes someone else’s patent or vicev-
ersa. In practice, patent databases are rarely consulted for reasons other
than legal purposes in most industries (Oppenheim 1998, Tang et al. 2001).
This holds particularly for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), due to
the high costs involved in expert consultation of patent databases.
Against this background, the pharmaceutical industry is characterized
by: a strong link of innovative activity to its scientific underpinnings, a high
degree of cumulativeness at the sector level and a large presence of R&D
spillovers, a remarkably high degree of R&D intensity, and high uncertainty
both on the R&D and market sides4.
4A rather uncontroversial account of the success rate of innovative efforts in the phar-
maceutical industry reveals that less than 1 percent of the new compounds object of
preclinical investigation reach the human testing stage and that only around 20 percent of
compounds going through the clinical trials ultimately gains FDA approval (DiMasi 1995).
As for market uncertainty, a hint of its relevance comes from observing the distribution of
returns to R&D for new drug introductions, which is highly skewed, with few blockbuster
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While the limited empirical evidence available to date supports at best
a marginal role of patent-related information in most technological sectors,
there are at least three reasons to think that the relevance of patent-induced
information disclosure in pharmaceuticals is much higher than elsewhere.
The first is that patents do play a much greater role overall in the pharma-
ceutical domain as compared to almost any other technological domain, as
extensively documented by numerous empirical accounts of appropriability
conditions in a range of sectors (Levin et al. 1987, Cohen et al. 2000).
The second reason is related to the importance of patents for the divi-
sion of innovative labor between public research institutions, biotech compa-
nies and pharmaceutical corporations and market for technologies in general
(Arora et al. 2001, Orsenigo et al. 2001). Innovation in this domain involves a
range of actors, characterized by different motivations, incentives and ethos,
especially with regard to the disclosure and diffusion of scientific informa-
tion, with the consequence that patent disclosure becomes a particularly
crucial means of bridging the gaps across the different innovative milieu. A
link could thus be traced between the structure of innovative activity and
the relevance of patent disclosures.5
The third reason is even more compelling and is more strictly related
to the nature of R&D competition in pharmaceuticals that is the object of
this paper. A number of important evolutionary trends have fundamentally
reshaped the pharmaceutical industry in the past thirty years, strengthen-
ing the interactions between basic science and product development, with
advances in physiology, pharmacology, enzymology, cell biology and later
molecular biology strongly affecting the patterns of technological develop-
ment (Gambardella 1995, Henderson et al. 1999).
The connectedness of drug development to its scientific underpinnings
has at the same time increased the range of scientific opportunities avail-
able to players in the industry and increased the likelihood that firms pur-
sue “parallel” trajectories of development, simultaneously working on com-
pounds belonging to the same therapeutic class. Different firms pursue
drugs accounting for most of the returns (Grabowski et al. 2002). Moreover, while the
degree of cumulativeness is overall high in the sector, cumulativeness at the firm level is
low. Indeed, once a firm introduces a new product of major therapeutic value, its rivals
explore the new line of research trying to develop similar or related drugs, and, in this
race, the discovering firm seems not to have an advantage in discovering chemically re-
lated drugs. Sutton (1998) analyzed the top 50 selling drugs in 1960, 1973, and 1986 and
provided evidence of high instability in the leadership within therapeutic classes.
5The evidence presented in this paper looks at this link but highlights the reverse di-
rection of causation, the one running from patent disclosures to the structure of innovative
activity.
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alternative approaches to drug development that represent a particular in-
stantiation of the inflow of scientific opportunities opened up by basic re-
search results and, at the same time, contribute to validate and extend such
results, in the context of a process that cannot aptly be characterized as
linear (Orsenigo et al. 2001). This magnifies the impact on research pro-
ductivity of knowledge spillovers across firms, as confirmed empirically by
Henderson and Cockburn (1996), leading firms to actively seek the exploita-
tion of such spillovers.
Patents play a key role in the context of parallel development described
above, where firms’ monitoring of competitors’ achievements can rely on
few means other than patent-induced information disclosures. This is true
in two respects. On one side, firms learn from each other’s successes, i.e.
patent-disclosed information offers guidance on the biological and therapeu-
tic properties of any product that reaches the market. On the other side,
information conveyed by patents might turn out to be useful also when it
concerns projects that are discontinued. Indeed, the innovation process in
pharmaceuticals can be though of as a trial-and-error process, where firms
learn from failures as they do from successes. This question – that of the
role played by research failures in the pharmaceutical innovation race – has
been so far neglected in the literature and constitutes the focus of this paper.
In fact, this sort of information might be considered particularly important
in light of the fact that in most cases firms do not publicly disclose the rea-
sons behind their failures, making the associated patent the unique source
of information available.
Disclosure function is guaranteed through scientific publications in peer
reviewed journals (open science), patents (commercial science) or by patent-
paper pairs (Murray and Stern 2007). However a vast literature has doc-
umented a strong bias in open science toward the publication of positive
results. In the following we document the value of failures in pharmaceuti-
cal R&D. Since innovation in pharmaceuticals builds upon failures as well as
on successes, we conclude that patents have a role in disclosing information
about unsuccessful drug candidates which is not easily replicable by open
science. Thus we suggest to extend compulsory disclosure for patented drugs
to clinical trial results.
3 Data, Methods, and Results
For the sake of this project we have brought together two large datasets
and linked them through an elaborate matching process: the first comprises
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all pharmaceutical and biotechnology patents granted by the USPTO since
1965, including their patent citations6; the second comprises firm data at
the level of specific R&D projects drawn from the Pharmaceutical Indus-
try Database (PHID) maintained at the University of Siena, comprising the
development history of all pharmaceutical R&D projects worldwide under-
taken during the last 25 years7.
Our analysis relies upon about 2,000 drug candidate-patent pairs, classi-
fied according to the final outcome of the R&D project (marketed or discon-
tinued). In our sample 58 percent of patents are associated to discontinued
compounds, whereas 42 percent are associated to a patent that has been
successful in reaching the market8.
Following the NBER tradition9, we employ patent citations as an indi-
cator of knowledge utilization and spillovers. The key assumption is that a
citation made to a previous patent denotes a knowledge transfer from the
cited patent to the citing one: more frequently cited patents contribute to
a larger share of subsequent innovations10. Since we focus on R&D com-
petition in the pharmaceutical industry, only citations from patents in the
pharmaceutical domain have been taken into account. We distinguish self-
citations from citations made by other companies, as they provide different
indications about the nature of technology, appropriability conditions and
knowledge spillovers. On the one side, self-citations are indicative of re-
search trajectories strongly rooted within the firm/institution boundaries.
On the other side, citations by firms/institutions other than the original in-
novator have been fruitfully employed in tracking knowledge spillovers (Hall
et al. 2001, Jaffe et al. 2000).
First, we compare the raw number of citations received by marketed and
discontinued projects.
Figure 1 plots the average citation functions, i.e. the likelihood that a
6US patents in selected IPC and US classes are included in the database.
7For a subset of projects, the database lists the patents protecting the compound under
study. Old molecules and/or natural products, which do not have any associated patent
have been omitted. For projects listing a patent granted by a patent office other than the
USPTO, we considered the US patent in the same family as the one listed in the database.
In case no US patent is identified, the record is not considered in the analysis.
8We refer to marketed/discontinued patents as the patents associated to mar-
keted/discontinued R&D projects.
9See Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002) and the literature referenced therein.
10We are aware that patent citation count is only a noisy proxy of the relevance of the
knowledge disclosed, since citations might be included for strategic purposes or added by
firm’s lawyers or by patent examiners (Alcacer and Gittelman 2004). However, survey
evidence shows that, even if noisy, patent citations are indicative of knowledge spillovers
and communication among inventors (Jaffe et al. 2000).
9
patent will receive a citation as a function of the time elapsed from grant
date, computed on the basis of observed data11.
Figure 1: Observed average citation lag distribution
Consistently with previous literature showing that the number of cita-
tions received by a patent is positively associated to its value12, discontin-
ued patents receive, on average, a number of citations that is lower than the
number of citation received by patents associated to marketed projects.
The distinction in the chemical journals between leadlike and druglike
compounds is useful in interpreting the results. The failed project might
be indicative of a dead end, and therefore the citation is the result of a
negative outcome. But it could also be the case that the failed patent
protects a compound, which could be either toxic or ineffective, but that
presents good (even though sub-optimal) target binding affinity properties
11See Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1996) for details.
12Trajtenberg (1990); Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999); Harhoff et al. (1999); Jaffe
et al. (2000); Trajtenberg et al. (1997); Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002).
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and is the antecedent of a new set of molecules that build around the failed
one. Even though the compound provides no returns to the innovating
firm, a positive social value is associated with the identification of the new
mechanism of action or of the new compound, or on the negative side, of its
ineffectiveness or its toxic effects, therefore pointing to research trajectories
that shouldn’t be pursued to avoid waste of resources.
Next, in order to analyze the patterns of technological competition, the
role of information provided by science and R&D outcomes, we separately
consider the pattern of citation (as a proxy for the diffusion and utilization
of knowledge) before and after the outcome of the R&D project associated
to the patent becomes known13, i.e. the R&D project is either discontinued
or ends with the launch of a product on the market.
By comparing the share of self-citations and the share of citations re-
ceived by other companies, interesting conclusions can be drawn about the
nature of the R&D competition in pharmaceuticals.
The first column of Table 1 reports the number (and shares) of dis-
continued and marketed patents respectively. Our sample comprises 1,243
discontinued patents and 897 marketed patents.
Next, we report the share of citations received, respectively, by discontin-
ued and marketed patents after the project is terminated (either marketed
or discontinued) with respect to the total number of citations received. The
Table reports the figures both for citations by other firms and self-citations14.
% citation avg. number
N (%) after the outcome of early citations
Outcome self-cits. cits. by other self-cits. cits. by other
Discontinued pt. 1,243 (58%) 19.9 45.7 0.88 1.68
Marketed pt. 897 (42%) 43.1 63.3 0.87 1.95
Table 1: Share of citations received after the outcome of the projects, and
early citations (within five years from patent application)
In the case of discontinued patents, about 80 percent of self-citations
13We compare the date of termination of the project (either marketed or discontinued)
with the application year of the citing patents. Need it here to mention that average time
to market or to discontinuation is not substantially different, being equal to 7.8 years for
discontinued R&D projects and to 8.3 years for marketed R&D projects.
14100 represents the total number of observed citations (respectively, self-citations and
citations by other companies/institutions) for each patent. For example, 19.9 percent of
the self-citations made to discontinued patents take place after the outcome of the project
becomes known. Put it differently, 80.1 percent of the self-citations made to discontinued
patents take place before the project is terminated.
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is made before the compound is known to be a failure, while the share
decreases to 60 percent for marketed patents, i.e. a large part of patents
associated to discontinued R&D projects are abandoned by the innovating
firm after the properties of the associated compound are understood, but
they still represent the ground for subsequent innovation by other companies:
45.7 percent of citations received by discontinued patents and made by a
company other than the original innovator take place after the time the
project is discontinued. The figure is higher for marketed patents, but it
is not surprising that successful compounds, leading to products that are
commercialised on the market, continue to induce research (i.e. to receive
citations) after the commercialization of the compound. Available evidence
shows that after the introduction of a new product of major therapeutic
value, the rivals of the innovating firm explore new lines of research trying to
develop similar or related drugs, therefore leading to citations of the patent
protecting the original compound (Sutton 1998). On the other side, it is
of interest to understand the rationale behind the citations to discontinued
compounds, still taking place after the compound under study is known to
be toxic or ineffective for the originally targeted disease.
In most cases failures are not the subject of publications, therefore very
limited information is available about the reasons behind the discontinuation
of the research related to the compounds. The only information in the public
domain about the characteristics of the compound under development can
be found in the patent(s).
Next we take into account the average number of citations received in the
early years after patent application, before the termination of the project.
A time frame of five years from the application year is considered. Since
the time elapsed from discovery is limited, only few information are avail-
able about the properties of the protected compound/process, leading us
to expect no significant difference from the comparison of the distributions
characterizing discontinued patents and marketed patents. Indeed, on av-
erage, within the first five years from the application date, discontinued
patents receive 0.88 self-citations, whereas the figure is 0.87 for marketed
patents. If citations by firms/institutions other than the original assignee
are considered, discontinued patents receive an average of 1.68 citations ver-
sus 1.95 citations for marketed patents. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does
not allow to reject the null hypothesis that the two distributions are drawn
from the same underlying population, even though a larger share of dis-
continued patents receive zero citations. This result, coupled with previous
findings (Figure 1), suggests that differences in citation behavior between
successes and failures are driven by post-outcome behavior, i.e. from the
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citations received by the patent after the launch of the associated product
on the market15.
The disclosure of the information about the compound under study in
patents and the advances in science sets the ground for a “race” for reaching
the market, where competitors start exploring the new research arena pur-
suing parallel research trajectories even though the outcome is still highly
uncertain. Competition on the R&D side in the pharmaceutical industry is
substantial and firms entering the new research arena build both on failures
and successes.
Does the outcome of the cited references provide information about the
future outcome of current research efforts? Put it differently, do patents
citing a success (failure) have a higher (lower) probability of success?
Table 2 reports the average probability of success of patents classified
according to the outcome of their backward references16. We distinguish four
categories: (i) 1,579 patents with no information about cited patents; (ii) 167
patents citing at least one previous failure; (iii) 264 patents citing at least
one previous success; and (iv) 47 patents citing both previous successes and
previous failures. For each category we computed the average probability
of success by looking at the share of successes, i.e. at the ratio between
marketed patents and the total number of patents in each cell.
Citing previous failure?
Citing previous success? No Yes Total
No 38.32 13.77 35.97
(1,579) (167) (1,746)
Yes 66.29 42.55 62.70
(264) (47) (311)
Total 42.32 20.93 40.00
(1,843) (214) (2,057)
Table 2: Probability of success of patent-projects building on fail-
ures/successes (number of patent-projects considered for computation in
parenthesis)
On average, patents citing previous failure have a lower probability of
15Further research is needed to properly address this issue. Moreover, in order to dis-
tinguish “real” knowledge spillovers, it would be useful to distinguish the citations added
by the patent examiner.
16We further restrict our sample and discard patents applied for before the year 1980,
and patents assigned to individual inventors, leaving us with a sample of 2,057 patent-
projects.
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success, whereas patents citing a previous success have a higher probability
of success. The patents included in the analysis have a probability of reach-
ing the market of 40.00 percent. The rate of success changes substantially
if the patent cites at least one previous success (62.70%), whereas it almost
halves if the patent builds on at least one previous failure (20.93%). On
average, 38.32 percent of patents with no information about the outcome of
their backward references has reached the market, and the figure increases
to 66.29 percent for patents citing at least one previous success and no pre-
vious failures. On the contrary it is equal to 13.77 percent for patents citing
previous failures and no previous success.
Results in Table 2 seems to suggest that patents building on previous
success have a higher probability of success, and the probability of failure
substantially decreases if the patent builds on a previous failure. However,
we need to take into account the fact that the innovator selects the basis
of his/her innovation and we expect “good” compounds to build on “good”
research, whereas “bad” compounds are more likely to build on “bad” re-
search. Therefore, results in Table 2 might be driven only by the selection
capabilities on the side of the innovator. In order to disentangle this issue
we estimate a model where the dependent variable is an indicator of the suc-
cess of the project (i.e. it is equal to 1 if the patent/project is successfully
marketed, and 0 if the patent/project is discontinued), and the independent
variables aim at capturing the relevant characteristics of the cited patents,
i.e. of the research the patent builds upon. Explanatory variables included
in the analysis are described in Table 3, along with their mean and standard
deviation.
The main variables of interest are pt succ and pt fail, two dummy vari-
ables indicating respectively patents building on previous successes and
failures. The dummies pt succpst and pt failpst further distinguish those
patents by taking into account the timing of the citations: they only con-
sider citations to previous successes or failures made when the outcome of
the cited patent has already been disclosed (i.e. the compound is either
launched on the market or announced to be discontinued). The variables
pt selfc, pt orig, pt science, and pt timeb aim at capturing major character-
istics of the innovation and are computed on the basis of backward citations.
These are built as described in Trajtenberg et al. (1997) but only taking into
account pharmaceutical citations.
A higher share of self citations (i.e. a higher pt selfc) indicates a higher
level of appropriability of the research on the side of the innovator, as self-
citations are indicative of the cumulative nature of the technology and a
measure of the extent to which innovators are able to reap the benefits of
14
Variable Description Mean StdD.
Explanatory variables
pt succ 1 if the patent-project cites a previous success,
0 otherwise
0.15 0.36
pt fail 1 if the patent-project cites a previous failure, 0
otherwise
0.10 0.31
pt succpst 1 if the patent-project cites a previous success
(after the outcome is known), 0 otherwise
0.06 0.24
pt failpst 1 if the patent-project cites a previous failure
(after the outcome is known), 0 otherwise
0.03 0.16
pt selfc share of self citationsa 0.15 0.30
pt orig index of originality of the patenta 0.44 0.37
pt science share of references to non-patent literaturea 0.29 0.33
pt timeb average time lag (computed on backward
citations)a
5.09 4.32
ass coree share of assignee’s patents within the same IPC
of the patent
0.11 0.21
trend time trend (1 if application year is 1980 to 21) 9.83 4.71
Instruments
pt importbimportance (in terms of received citations) of
cited patentsa
75.95 505.4
Nfailure number of previous failed patents 646.0 441.3
Nsuccess number of previous successful patents 580.2 239.6
a Please refer to Trajtenberg et al. (1997) for a detailed description.
Table 3: Description of the variables included in the regressions
their own research (Hall et al. 2001). The index of originality of the patent
(pt orig) measures the breadth of the technological roots of the innovation:
higher value of the index indicate that the patent under analysis builds on
previous patents spanning many different IPC classes. pt science aims at
capturing the reliance of research on scientific sources: this is the share of
references to non-patent literature, as a percentage of the total number of
references (both patents and articles in scientific journals). As it is well
documented in the literature, the innovation process in the biopharmaceu-
tical industry relies heavily on the advances in “basic science”, i.e. in the
basic understanding of the mechanisms characterizing the targeted diseases.
A higher share of non-patent literature is associated with a higher degree
of basicness of the innovation and, likely, a stronger linkage with public re-
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search organizations, whose advances are typically disclosed trough scientific
publications.
The last variable built on the basis of patent information, pt timeb,
measures the time distance between the citing and the cited patents. The
higher pt timeb, the older the sources the patent builds upon, therefore the
wider the knowledge base available to the innovating firm.
In order to control for firm capabilities in the technology class of the
innovation, ass core measure the share of assignee’s patents within the same
IPC of the patent under study.
Finally a time trend is included in order to take into account the increase
in attrition rates that has been characterizing pharmaceutical research over
the Nineties (Mervis 2005).
Results are reported in Table 4. A probit model is applied, and we
also consider an instrumental variable (IV) approach in order to solve the
endogeneity issue concerning pt succ and pt fail17.
As expected the time trend is negative: younger patents exhibits lower
probability of success, coherently with the increase in attrition rates that is
characterizing the industry.
Coherently with the results in Table 2, standard probit analysis highlight
a positive association between the success of previous cited patent references
and the patent under study. Results change substantially when the IV
approach is considered. The estimated “IV-Probit” coefficient of pt succ
is no longer significant, pointing to the fact that success does not breed
success. With regard to failures, no clear-cut picture emerges from our
analysis. When all citations are considered, building on a previous failure
substantially reduces the probability of success, even though the coefficient is
not precisely estimated. If post-outcome citations to failures are considered,
the coefficient is positive but only statistically significant at the 10 percent
level. All in all, building on a previous success does not assure a higher
probability of success, whereas evidence about patents that build on previous
failures is mixed.
As far as the characteristics of the research the patent builds upon, only
pt science exerts a positive and significant effect on the probability of suc-
cess. Not surprisingly, given the characteristics of the innovation process in
pharmaceuticals, stronger linkage with basic science increases the probabil-
ity of success.
17The IVs selected for pt succ and pt fail are a measure of importance of the backward
citations (pt importb), the number of previous failed patents (Nfailure), and number of
previous successful patents (Nsuccess).
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Variable Probit IV-Probit IV-Probit
pt succ 0.7740∗∗∗ 1.0615
(.0876) (1.090)
pt fail -0.6217∗∗∗ -4.3346∗∗
(.1103) (1.879)
pt succpst 1.2966
(1.3984)
pt failpst 5.6629∗
(2.9359)
pt selfc 0.0230 0.4413 -0.2414
(.1104) (.3738) (.2054)
pt orig -0.2806∗∗∗ -0.4316∗ 0.0713
(.0996) (.2537) (.2399)
pt science 0.3653∗∗∗ 0.6195∗∗∗ 0.2778∗
(.1091) (.2251) (.1468)
pt timeb 0.0146∗ 0.0261 -0.0160
(.0084) (.0267) (.0240)
ass coree 0.6345∗∗∗ 0.5734∗∗ 0.8123∗∗∗
(.1454) (.2048) (.2091)
trend -0.0550∗∗∗ -0.0302∗∗ -0.0902∗∗∗
(0.0071) (.0152) (.0162)
constant -0.0333 -0.0235 0.1702
(.0856) (.1686) (.1338)
∗∗∗ 1% - ∗∗ 5% - ∗ 10% statistical significance
Table 4: Estimation results
Also ass core exerts a positive and statistically significant effect: a higher
probability of success characterizes patents where the innovator has previous
substantial knowledge as measure by the share of assignee’s previous patents
within the same IPC of the patent, and this might be the result of wider
experience in the developed technology.
Summing up, the analysis reveals that patents represent an important
source of information for monitoring the R&D activities undertaken by com-
petitors and provide a spur to innovative efforts by other firms in related
fields or in the same area of application of the original patent. Nonethe-
less building on a previous success does not assure a higher probability of
reaching the market.
The case studies presented in the next Section will allow us to further in-
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vestigate the dynamics of technological competition arising from knowledge
disclosure in patents.
4 Case Studies
Two case studies in the fields of inflammation and cancer are discussed.
The analysis presented in this Section are based upon literature search and
patent text analysis. Certainly, results of these studies cannot be extended
beyond their field of application and generalized to pharmaceutical inno-
vation. Nonetheless, they provide some hints on the nature of R&D com-
petition in pharmaceuticals. Typically pharmaceutical research advances
through a process of trial-and-error, where both successes and failures play
a role in guiding subsequent innovative efforts. Parallel research trajectories
are pursued as the result of fierce competition driven by science in molecular
biology and by the disclosure of relevant information through patents and
scientific publications.
In the MAPK p38 case, a vast array of research efforts were building
on pioneer compounds, highly cited, that never reached the market. In the
case of DNA topoisomerase I inhibitors, knowledge disclosed in patents of
compounds that never reached the market contributed to successful devel-
opment of follow-on drugs by firms other than the original innovator. Next,
more effective drugs with less side effects have been developed based on
knowledge about first-in-class compounds.
The distinction between druglike and leadlike compounds is useful in
understanding the pattern described, especially in the p38 MAPK case.
The two set of compounds differ in terms of chemical characteristics (Oprea
et al. 2001). The analysis of these characteristics is of little interest for our
purposes, nonetheless the distinction between leads and drugs can help us to
understand the patterns of R&D competition highlighted in this paper. Lead
structures typically do not exhibit optimal target binding affinity, nonethe-
less they have characteristics that make them starting points in medicinal
chemistry efforts, and patent citation data offer a way to track subsequent
research efforts. Indeed, the pioneer compound analyzed in the p38 case
study, i.e. SB-203580, identified as a lead by Oprea et al. (2001), never got
to the market but is highly cited.
4.1 MAPK p38 inhibitors
The p38 mitogen activated protein kinase (MAPK) is a serine-threonine
kinase which regulates the production of pro-inflammatory cytokines, such
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as IL-1 and TNF-α. These cytokines play a central role in the body’s in-
flammatory response. Excess levels of IL-1 and TNF are associated with a
broad range of acute and chronic inflammatory diseases such as rheumatoid
arthritis, osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, inflammatory bowel disease, asthma,
atheroscleresis, and cachexia. As a whole, the inflammatory disease US mar-
ket is expected to reach a value of 8 billions of USD in 2007. The potential
market size, high competition and rapid advances in this field have urged
companies to base their decisions uniquely on the most recent discoveries
and projections, even if no compound targeting p38 has reached the market
yet. This has led to a vast array of drug candidates targeting p38, which
have failed to reach the market but whose associated patents are highly
cited.
The most widely studied class of p38 MAPK inhibitors are the vicinal
aryl/ pyridine-4-yl heterocycles. Anti-inflammatory activity for this struc-
tural class was first reported in the early Eighties in two patents18 by Glax-
oSmithKline (GSK), the first mover in this field. The molecular target has
been unravelled only later in 1994 by GSK researchers (Lee et al. 1994).
Since then, as demonstrated by the number of R&D projects and sub-
mitted patents, several big pharmaceutical companies and emerging biotech
firms have undertaken research programs focused on the p38 MAPK. At
present, more than 60 research programs have been started though a large
share has been discontinued before last phases of clinical trials and no com-
pound has reached the market so far.
GSK has been leading the way by reporting 2,4,5-triarylimidazole in-
hibitors and filing an extensive array of patents claiming compounds based
on optimization of the pyridylimidazole template represented by SB-203580,
the first p38 inhibiting compound in preclinical trials. Even if the lead com-
pound SB-203580 showed to be a very selective inhibitor of p38 MAPK
occupying the ATP-binding site, its development was discontinued in 1998
probably due to potent inhibition of hepatic cytocrome P450 isoenzymes,
posing toxicological problems in drug development.
In the following years, numerous replacements for the imidazole scaffold
of the original lead were disclosed in the patent literature19. Most of the
research projects based on these compounds have been discontinued.
After several compounds were patented with structural homology to SB-
203580, structurally different p38 inhibitors were disclosed by different com-
18US4175127, WO8801169.
19Oxazole: WO9513067, US5559137. Pyrazole: WO9705877, WO9705878. Substituted
pyrazole: WO9852937, WO9852940, WO9852941, WO9852558.
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panies, e.g. Vertex and Boheringer Ingelheim, both citing patents by GSK
claiming imidazole as the central ring.
Vertex was the first company to develop a molecule belonging to the class
of nitrogen containing heterocyclic compounds. VX-745, the first product
to enter clinical trials and to reach phase 2, showed good anti-inflammatory
efficacy but was discontinued due to concerns regarding possible neurological
adverse effects. Research by Vertex is still active and a back-up compound
has been selected (VX-702), now in phase II clinical trial for cardiovascular
disorders, inflammation, and rheumatoid arthritis.
In 1999, Boehringer Ingelheim was granted a patent claiming a diaryl
urea inhibitor (BIRB-796) which binds a different allosteric binding pocket
of p38 MAPK that is spatially distinct from the ATP pocket. This com-
pound seemed to overcome the toxicity problems related to SB-203580 and
structural homologues. BIRB-796 moved into phase III clinical trial for
psoriasis, and was the first p38 MAPK inhibitor to reach this stage of de-
velopment. However, Boehringer Ingelheim announced the discontinuation
of BIRB-796 R&D project in 2005.
The citation pattern for BIRB-796 depicts an interesting trend: no ci-
tations came from other firms, while six new patents citing the original one
were applied for by Boehringer Ingelheim few years before discontinuing the
BIRB project, indicating active research around the original compound.
Even if GSK disclosed the first anti-inflammatory compounds targeting
p38 MAP kinase almost ten years ago, the race for the first drug based
on p38 MAPK inhibition is still open. Other companies have entered the
field building on the pioneer patents and the information disclosed therein.
This dynamic is reflected in the pattern of citations. The patents related to
SB-203580 are highly cited, and still continue to receive citations both from
GSK and its rivals, even though their development has been discontinued.
Figure 2 reports the number of patents covering p38 MAPK compounds
applied for in the US in the year 1998-2002, soon after the time the original
SB compound has been discontinued (top panel). The bottom panel report
the share of patents citing the original imidazole compounds by GSK: about
20% of patents still cite the original research even though the compound is
known to exert toxicological effects.
4.2 DNA topoisomerase inhibitors
Camptothecin (CPT) was first discovered in a National Cancer Institute
drug screen of naturally occuring agents in 1966 from the bark of the Chi-
nese tree Camptotheca Acuminata (Wall et al. 1966). Potent cytotoxic
20
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Figure 2: p38 patents: (top) number of patents applied for in the US,
(bottom) share of patents citing the original SB compound
activity was immediately noticed. However, early clinical trials with the
sodium salt of CPT in the 1970’s were soon discontinued because severe and
often unpredictable side effects (myelosuppression and haemorrhagic cysti-
tis). Further clinical work was suspended until, in 1985, researchers of GSK
in Philadelphia (US) in collaboration with the John Hopkins University dis-
covered that human DNA topoisomerase I (Topo I) is the molecular target of
CPT (Hsiang et al. 1985)20. Unfortunately, the lactone ring of CPT, which is
necessary for a proper fit into the active size of Topo I, is readily hydrolyzed
to the carboxylate inactive form at physiological pH. In addition, CPT is
fairly insoluble. Thus, since then, CPT has become the prototype Topo I
20One of the more exciting developments in oncology has been the identification of
Topo I as a molecular target of a variety of anticancer drugs. First discovered in 1971, the
enzymes are referred to as topoisomerases because they are able to change the topology
of DNA molecules without changing the underlying chemical structure of the DNA.
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specific inhibitor and several institutions have started research projects to
discover more stable and soluble CPT analogues compounds. CPT deriva-
tives specifically target Topo I leading to premature termination of DNA
replication and inhibition of transcription. Cells can repair DNA breaks
caused by low doses of CPT, whereas higher doses lead to cell death. Since
many neoplastic cells are characterized by high levels and activities of Topo
I, this enzyme has become one of the main cellular targets for anticancer
therapy. Although the pathway which leads from Topo I drug target DNA
damage to cell death is not entirely clear yet, the number of patents granted
each year concerning CPTs has increased steadily from 1995. Although
these numbers testify the ramping interest in this field, a large number of
them concern formulations, drug delivery systems and combinations with
other drugs rather than innovative compounds (Dallavalle et al. 2002).
Figure 3 represents the pattern of citations received by patents that have
been matched to the main camptothecin analogue compounds: Irinotecan,
Topotecan, and 9-aminocamptothecin (9AC), whose chemical structures are
reported in Figure 4 along with the chemical structure of camptothecin lead
compound. On the x-axis time is reported from first patent grant to 2004,
whereas the y-axis reports the cumulated number of citations received by
the patent associated to each compound. The line markers identify the
development stage in each year.
Irinotecan and Topotecan are the only two candidate drugs that have
been launched worldwide. Irinotecan has been introduced in 1994 by the
Japanese company Yakult Honsha KK for colon carcinoma and Topotecan
by GSK for lung and ovarian carcinoma in 1996. Irinotecan is one of the
most active agents gastrointestinal (GI) tumours; however, it has heavy side
effects such as concurrent GI and hematological toxicities. On the contrary,
the toxicity of topotecan is principally hematological and patients with renal
insufficiently require significant dose reduction. In both cases, there is room
for more effective and better tolerated drugs. At present, more than 90 R&D
projects focused on the development of Topo I inhibitors have been started
and more than 60% of them are still active.
The year 1994, when 9AC entered into human clinical trials and irinote-
can reached the market, reports a sharp increase in the citation trend of
the three compounds in the Figure. After this year the two series or 9AC
and Irinotecan proceed paired until 2001, when the citations to Irinotecan
seem to stabilize, whereas 9AC still continues to receive citations, even if
the development has been discontinued. Even if not general, the pattern is
interesting since the patents associated to the three compounds are deeply
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interwined21. In fact, Irinotecan is cited by 9AC, and both are cited by
Topotecan.
After the commercialization of the successful compound (irinotecan), the
(unsuccessful) molecule (9AC) still continues to receive citations, even after
the decision to discontinue its development. Moreover, the analysis shows
the high uncertainty of the drug discovery activity. Building on marketed
products does not assure success. Indeed, the 9AC patent benefits from the
information in the Irinotecan patent, even though the associated research
has been discontinued. On the contrary, the Topotecan patent, citing both
9AC and irinotecan led to a marketed compound.
All in all, the pharmaceutical R&D process characterizes itself as a trial
21Check the similarity in molecular structures reported in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Chemical structure of camptothecin and selected analogues.
and error process, where both successes and failures contribute to the ad-
vances of the technological frontier. This is testified by the size and direction
of knowledge spillovers, as measured by patent citations, since both success-
ful and failed compounds still receive citations after the termination of the
associated project.
5 Concluding Discussion
The evidence presented in this paper contributes to enrich our understand-
ing of the dual nature of patents and of their fundamental contribution to
information disclosure (Arrow 1962), unraveling the complexity of dynamics
of knowledge production and competition in pharmaceutical R&D. The in-
formation disclosed through patents leads to an expansion of the knowledge
frontier. The increase in knowledge further stimulates R&D efforts, both in
terms of new patents and new firms entering the research arena, therefore
stimulating competition within the industry, and fostering research in the
new field.
Building on a integrated and comprehensive dataset about the innovative
activities of the firms and institutions operating within the pharmaceutical
domain, we are able to link a sample of patent to the development history of
the protected compound, allowing us to distinguish successful patents, i.e.
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patents protecting compounds that are successfully marketed, from failed
patents, i.e. patents protecting compounds that are discontinued either in
preclinical or clinical trials. By taking into account patent citations, we
are able to assess knowledge transfers and linkages between different re-
search trajectories. Understanding the rationale behind the citing behavior
is important to understand the characteristics of R&D competition in phar-
maceuticals.
Our analysis shows that a large share of citations to marketed patents
take place after the compound is commercialized, proving to be safe and
effective in targeting a selected disease. This is not surprising, however
building on a previous success does not assure higher probability of success.
Differently from previous studies, our analysis also takes into account the
role of failures in providing the ground for subsequent innovation. While
information on biological and therapeutic properties of a pharmaceutical
product can be easily obtained when it reaches the market, in most cases
firms do not publicly disclose the reasons behind their failures, making the
associated patent the sole source of information available.
Citation patterns to discontinued compounds reveal interesting differ-
ences between innovator’s and rivals’ behavior. A small share of self-citation
is made by the original innovator to failed compound after the outcome has
been disclosed, nonetheless failed patents do provide information to firms
and institutions other than the original innovator also after the related re-
search is abandoned, as a large share of subsequent citations is made to
discontinued patents also after the time the outcome is disclosed.
Results about the effect on success probabilities of building on a fail-
ure are mixed, but overall our empirical analysis suggests the existence of
a social value associated to information disclosure on discontinued patents,
in terms of new (and sometimes better) research trajectories exploring new
therapies for treating a disease. Information contained in patents would be
greatly enriched by the disclosure of the information gathered during the
drug development process. Once a product is approved for marketing, a
wide variety of information is available about its properties. On the con-
trary, firm usually do not disclose information about their failures or about
compound toxicity or lack of efficacy and scientific journals prefer to pub-
lish positive outcomes and, with few recent notable exceptions in the case of
open-access online journals, it is extremely difficult to find negative results
in peer reviewed scientific journals.
Nonetheless, these would be valuable information for avoiding waste of
resources and duplication of efforts. In 2007, the U.S. Congress enacted
the FDA Amendments Act (FDAAA) which expand the scope of required
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registrations at ClinicalTrials.gov and provides for the first federally funded
trial results database22. It has been argued that disclosure of clinical results
could undermine competitive advantage. In this paper we show that the
social value of failures in drug development is much higher than the private
value and a full disclosure of clinical trial results is an important complement
to the patent disclosure function.
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